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This thesis develops multivariate logit models to estimate the impact of marital 
status and the independent effect of dependent children on nuclear submarine officer 
retention beyond the minimum service requirement (MSR). Using data from the Navy 
History Promotion File, the Naval Officer Fitness Report Summary File and the Officer 
Loss File, logit models are specified to analyze the probability of nuclear submarine 
officer retention beyond the MSR. The probabilities are modeled as functions of marital 
and dependency status, commissioning source, undergraduate major, age and early 
performance evaluations. The findings reveal that being married with dependent children 
at the 0-3 promotion board, being older at commissioning, being commissioned via an 
enlisted commissioning program and being recommended for accelerated promotion at 
least once as an 0-2 are all positive indicators of submarine officer retention beyond the 
MSR. Being commissioned via the Reserve Officer's Training Corps (ROTC) and the 
Officer Candidate School (OCS) are negatively associated with submarine officer 
retention. Based upon the research results, recommendations are made to conduct further 
research to determine retention elasticities of submarine officers based on dependency 
status to determine the most cost-effective means of improving junior officer retention. 
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The goal of this thesis is to statistically investigate the relationship between 
marital status and nuclear submarine officer retention in the United States Navy, and to 
assess the implications of any observed relationship for current defense manpower 
policies. The objective of this study is to provide policy-makers with useful information 
that may be applied to address the growing retention problem within this specialized core 
of naval officers. 
A. BACKGROUND 
In the nuclear submarine community an officer's first contractual obligation is 
completed at five years of active naval service. At this point, the submarine officer's 
military obligation is complete, allowing him to choose between civilian job 
opportunities and continued service in the U. S. Navy. Since the early 1990's, nuclear 
submarine officer retention beyond this initial obligation has become an issue of 
increased concern. In fact, during this time, financial bonuses for service continuation 
have been raised twice, and department head tour lengths have increased from 36 months 
to 39 months in an effort to keep submarines adequately manned with highly skilled 
nuclear-trained officers. 
According to Naval Nuclear Power representatives within the Bureau of Naval 
Personnel, recent separation rates for single nuclear submarine officers are much higher 
than those of their married counterparts. In fact, the data provided by these 
representatives illustrate a very significant difference in retention by marital status for all 
nuclear submarine officers commissioned in the early 1990's. For example, data 
provided for all nuclear submarine officers commissioned in 1993 show that only 32.9% 
of single officers continued in active naval service beyond their initial contractual 
obligation. On the other hand, 63.1% of the officers who were married prior to five years 
of active service retained beyond this same obligation. (Per phone conversation with 
submarine community manager, November 2000) Similar trends describe all of the 
officers commissioned during the first half of that decade. 
Throughout the years, the U. S. Navy has tailored its manpower policies and 
programs to meet the needs of married sailors, officers and their families. However, with 
these apparent retention differences between married and single submarine officers, 
senior officials within the U. S. Navy now believe that marital status itself, as well as the 
manpower policies affecting married officers and their families, has now become a 
significant retention factor. 
B. OBJECTIVES 
This thesis statistically investigates the relationship between marital status and 
submarine officer retention beyond the first contractual obligation to determine if there is 
any observed relationship and, if so, whether marital status or corollary factors such as 
early performance evaluations, commissioning source, or undergraduate major are more 
significant in explaining retention. If, after accounting for these additional factors, 
marital status remains significantly related to retention, current manpower policies and 
programs may need to be examined for their potential influence on retention behavior. 
For example, differences in tangible benefits such as increased pay, military housing, 
separation allowances, healthcare and commissary privileges may promote a feeling of 
inequity between specific groups of submarine officers. As a result, policy-makers may 
need to reconsider the effect on retention behavior caused by differences in these benefits 
between married and single officers. 
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
As stated, the goal of this study is to statistically investigate the relationship 
between marital status and nuclear submarine officer retention, and to assess the 
implication of any observed relationship for current defense manpower policies. 
Therefore, the research questions addressed in this study are: (1) What is the statistical 
relationship between marital status and officer retention in the nuclear submarine force, 
holding other retention factors constant? (2) What is the relationship between dependent 
children and officer retention in the nuclear submarine force? (3) What performance and 
demographic factors are correlated with retention? and (4) Which manpower policies 
within the submarine community appear to influence retention differences between 
married and single officers? 
D. SCOPE, LIMITATIONS AND ASSUMPTIONS 
The nuclear submarine officer community is the focus of this study due to the 
recent increase in losses of junior officers following their first contractual obligation. 
Marital status is examined as a predictor of retention to help policy-makers address 
current retention difficulties. 
Retention variables examined in this data set describe all nuclear submarine 
officers commissioned between 1977 and 1991. Retention beyond the initial contractual 
obligation is defined as a binary variable. Marital status is only examined at the end of 
this contractual obligation (5 years of active service), and will be defined as currently 
married or currently not married. The first analysis will examine the difference in 
retention between those currently married and those who are single. A second analysis 
will attempt to determine a separate independent effect of marital status and the presence 
of dependent children. Marital status will be interacted with dependent children to create 
three separate categories. The length of marriage and age of dependent children are not 
analyzed. 
E. ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY 
This study is organized into five chapters. Chapter II reviews current manpower 
policies and prior studies related to this research. Chapter HI provides a detailed 
description of the data set utilized for this research. It also presents the hypotheses tested, 
and fully explains the research methodologies used to construct this study's statistical 
models. Chapter IV provides the empirical results of the analysis. Chapter V details the 
conclusions of this study, and provides recommendations for policy and for further 
research. 
H. LITERATURE REVIEW 
As we look to the future, recruiting and retention are two of our 
biggest challenges, as well as the keys to our success. We are shifting our 
mindset from one dedicated to managing a shrinking end strength to one 
focused on aggressively recruiting the highest quality sailors and then 
encouraging the very best to stay Navy....Satisfactory retention over time 
will determine the success of our future force and our continued 
operational readiness. 
- Vice Admiral D.T. Oliver, Chief of Naval Personnel and Deputy 
Chief of Naval Operations (Manpower and Personnel), on naval recruiting 
and retention issues, made during a 1998 hearing before the Personnel 
Subcommittee of the Senate Armed Services Committee on Recruiting 
and Retention. 
As the United States Navy enters the twenty-first century, aggressive recruitment 
and retention of high quality sailors has become a top priority. Within the submarine 
force especially, increased attention has been focused on the declining retention rates of 
junior officers who have reached the end of their minimum service requirement (MSR). 
As noted by Nakada (1996), there is a relatively large amount of economic literature on 
enlisted retention behavior, but significantly less research has been conducted on officer 
retention. Although most researchers agree that increased monetary compensation 
generally improves both officer and enlisted retention rates, retention rates continue to 
remain low despite recent increases in basic pay and allowances. Thus, more detailed 
analyses of the non-pecuniary factors affecting retention are required. 
This chapter reviews current Department of Defense manpower policies that are 
applicable to the monetary compensation, both in pay and benefits, received by a nuclear 
submarine officer. Additionally, this chapter will describe the conclusions of prior 
research relevant to this study. 
A. CURRENT MANPOWER POLICIES 
Most economic models describing military retention behaviors establish a 
theoretical basis using the Annualized Cost of Leaving (ACOL) methodology. 
Developed at the Center for Naval Analyses, the ACOL model predicts military retention 
behavior by estimating the effect of changes in relative civilian and military 
compensation on the stay/leave decision. Economic retention models like the ACOL 
methodology assume that individuals seek to maximize utility when choosing whether to 
stay in the military or leave for the civilian sector (Hogan, 1990). This utility is 
determined by a simple comparison of the pecuniary and non-pecuniary factors 
describing military or civilian opportunities. Pecuniary factors consist of tangible aspects 
such as basic pay, allowances and specialty bonuses. On the other hand, non-pecuniary 
factors describe intangible job aspects such as family separation, commissary and naval 
exchange privileges and provisions for health care. Using these two categories for 
comparison, the models assume that individuals rank and choose occupations that will 
provide the greatest satisfaction or utility over their working lifetimes (Hogan, 1990). 
There are several complex measurement problems and potential biases that limit 
the ACOL model's usefulness in forecasting actual officer and enlisted retention 
behavior. Among these problems are the potential biases resulting from unobservable 
personal tastes, or personal characteristics such as marital status, commissioning source 
and undergraduate major. These potential biases are typically accounted for with the 
addition of specific control variables in statistical regression models. Although the 
addition of such control variables makes the model more accurate in forecasting actual 
retention rates, little effort is made to determine why they may actually affect the 
retention decision. Using the ACOL model as a theoretical framework, this study will 
examine the significance of selected control variables for nuclear submarine officers; 
however, it is first necessary to understand the pecuniary factors that also influence 
retention behavior. 
1.  Basic Pay and Allowances 
All naval officers, whether nuclear trained or not, receive basic pay based entirely 
on the officer's current rank and cumulative years of service. For cost of leaving 
comparisons, basic pay levels, as well as future increases are easily estimated by 
assuming a standard promotion path. Along with basic pay, there are two standard 
allowances also provided for all officers. First, all officers, regardless of rank or 
dependency status, are entitled to a full allowance for subsistence (BAS). BAS is 
provided to offset general subsistence (i. e., food) costs, and is generally considered part 
of an officer's basic pay. The final component of an officer's basic pay is the allowance 
provided for housing (BAH). This allowance is provided to pay for monthly housing 
expenses incurred at each respective duty station. It is payable to all active duty members 
and varies according to individual rank and dependency status. It is also generally 
considered part of an officer's basic pay. 
From a cost of leaving perspective, potentially significant BAH differences arise 
due to differences in dependency status. Although BAH also differs by location of an 
individual's duty station, a married officer, regardless of location, will always receive 
more money for housing expenses. For example, consider two U. S. Navy Lieutenants 
(0-3's) serving at the United States Naval Academy located in Annapolis, Maryland. 
One officer is not married and has no dependents. Using the Navy's basic pay tables 
approved for fiscal year 2001, he is entitled to an allowance of $1111.00 per month for 
housing. On the other hand, the second officer is married, and is therefore entitled to a 
BAH that is $376.00 higher. The married officer, although not senior in grade to the 
single officer, receives $1487.00 for housing expenses while the single officer only 
receives $1111.00. 
Aside from the strict monetary differences, the married officer also has more 
options for this allowance. He may use it to purchase or rent non-military housing, or he 
may forfeit the allowance and accept military housing for his family. Conversely, the 
single officer is not eligible for government quarters. Therefore, he can only use the 
allowance to purchase or rent non-military housing. Consequently, the lower BAH 
coupled with fewer options for its use may result in a lower cost of leaving for a single 
officer contemplating retention in the Navy. 
2. Special Pays and Allowances 
Submarine Officers are entitled to several types of special pay. First, all 
submarine officers are entitled to receive submarine duty pay. This specific pay is an 
incentive for operational submarine duty. It is received by all officers who are attached 
to an operational submarine or submarine operational command staff, as well as those 
officers undergoing training preliminary to assignment to a nuclear powered submarine. 
It is based solely on individual rank and time in service. Second, the Nuclear Officer 
Incentive Program (NOIP) provides special pay as a specific retention benefit for nuclear 
trained officers. Submarine officers who are qualified to supervise, operate and maintain 
naval nuclear propulsion plants can receive $19,000 a year if they obligate for a period no 
less than 3, 4 or 5 years on active duty past their current service requirement (COPAY). 
If an officer does not choose to obligate on active duty, he will still receive $12,500 for 
every year served beyond his current military obligation (AIB). Finally, although not 
submarine specific, officers with dependents receive a family separation allowance of 
$100.00 per month if their submarine is away from homeport for more than 30 
continuous days. The purpose of this allowance is to pay a member for added housing 
expenses resulting from enforced separation from dependents. 
Most retention-compensation research agrees that "pay does matter" to 
individuals contemplating retention in the armed services. This finding is especially true 
for economic research analyzing retention at the end of an individual's MSR (5 years of 
active service). Although the above is not a complete description of all pays and 
allowances available to a submarine officer, it provides the major pecuniary factors 
influencing his personal cost of leaving. 
B. RELEVANT PAST STUDIES 
As stated previously, little research has been conducted that analyzes the retention 
behavior of military officers   Further, when retention research is conducted, little effort 
is made to explain the significance of non-pecuniary factors on an individual's stay/leave 
decision. Although few studies have sought this explanation, many have identified 
interesting differences in retention behavior with the use of these same non-pecuniary 
factors as control variables in economic retention models. 
Michael Nakada and James Boyle performed one such study in 1996. Nakada and 
Boyle analyzed the effect of the NOEP program on nuclear officer retention, both surface 
and submarine, beyond the minimum service requirement.   At the end of this minimum 
service requirement, a submarine officer may choose to: (1) stay in the Navy under 
contractual obligation (COP AY); (2) stay in the Navy under no contractual obligation 
(AIB); or (3) leave the Navy. By analyzing submarine officers commissioned between 
fiscal year 1974 and 1989, the study showed that increases in NOIP positively influenced 
retention behavior of submarine officers at the end of their MSR. The study determined 
that although retention bonus elasticities were relatively small, their statistical 
significance indicated that increases in bonus amounts subsequently increased the 
probability of staying in the Navy beyond MSR. More pertinent to this study, however, it 
further identified significant differences in retention behavior among different 
demographic groups. 
Of the year groups analyzed, most officers were single at the end of their MSR, 
and they had the lowest retention rate at 62 percent. If they stayed beyond MSR, single 
officers were much less likely to extend with obligation:  17 percent of all officers 
without dependents at MSR retained under contractual obligation, while 44 percent chose 
to remain under no obligation. On the other hand, 26 percent of those with one 
dependent, and 34 percent of those with more than one dependent chose to stay in the 
Navy under obligation. Further, 40 percent of the officers who were married at MSR, 
and 39 percent of those with more than one dependent chose to remain without incurring 
an additional obligation. Therefore, Nakada's study, as well as a 1981 NOIP study 
performed by the Center for Naval Analyses found that as the number of dependents 
increased, the likelihood the officer stayed increased, and if he stayed, the likelihood that 
he was obligated also increased. Again in 1996, Nakada conducted another study to 
analyze the effect of NOIP increases on retention each year beyond an officer's MSR. 
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(Nakada, et al., 1996) This second study found that both pay and demographic effects 
were consistent with the earlier research. 
Additional studies have also identified differing retention behaviors among 
married and single officers. Mehay (1995) analyzed performance differences such as 
promotion, retention and fitness report evaluations between majority and minority Navy 
and Marine Corps officers. The study's data set was constructed from Promotion Board 
History Files for 1985-1990 and then merged with fitness report history files. Because 
many civilian studies have found that married workers and those with children to be more 
productive (measured by earnings) (Krieg, 2000), the study used marital status, as well as 
number of dependents as demographic control variables. Mehay found that married 
officers or those with dependents were more likely to remain in the Navy until the 0-4 
promotion board (approximately 10 years of service). Although marital status and 
number of dependents were used effectively as a control variable for performance, 
inferences regarding their impact on retention behavior should be made cautiously. The 
study fails to account for potential marital status and dependency status changes between 
the 0-3 promotion board (approximately 4 years of service) and the 0-4 promotion board 
(approximately 10 years of service). Therefore, the effect of these variables on actual 
retention behavior is difficult to quantify. 
In a retention study of surface warfare officers, Bautista (1996) attempted to 
account for the bias that might arise from failing to account for marriage timing. His 
study determined that surface warfare officers who were married at the Lieutenant level 
(approximately 4 years of active service) were more likely to separate than those who 
were married at commissioning. Analyzing this relationship from a cost of leaving 
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perspective, he inferred that an officer who had been married for a longer period would 
more likely have more than one dependent at the end of his MSR. Therefore, his cost of 
leaving could be higher than the newly married Lieutenant because more emphasis is 
placed on the non-pecuniary benefits (commissary, health care and job stability) available 
for his family within the naval service. 
This thesis attempts only to explain the significance of marital and dependency 
status on retention beyond a submarine officer's MSR regardless of the length of 
marriage. Therefore, the timing bias associated with marriage and family discussed in 
the Baustista and Mehay studies is not analyzed. Rather, the effect of marital and 
dependency status is analyzed specifically for the nuclear submarine officer community 
at a specific point in time 
Contrary to the findings regarding marital and dependency status above, Bowman 
(1990) found that marital status actually had a negative effect on nuclear officer retention. 
The study utilized 1560 U S Naval Academy (USNA) graduates commissioned between 
1976 and 1980. This subset of officers does not represent all USNA graduates during this 
time. Rather, it contains only those graduates who were selected into perceived technical 
warfare communities - surface and submarine warfare. Bowman found that married 
officers in the nuclear navy were far less likely than single officers to remain beyond 
their MSR. His study found that those with children were 27.8 percent less likely to 
remain and those without children were 35.6 percent less likely to remain beyond five 
years of active service (Bowman, 1990) 
Bowman's results are contrary to most retention research incorporating marital 
and dependency status as control variables. This difference may be explained by the 
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nature of the data. Using only graduates from the Naval Academy, the data set may not 
be representative of the overall population of nuclear trained officers. Furthermore, the 
study utilized officers commissioned in the late 1970s. Differing studies, like those 
conducted by Nakada and Mehay, have analyzed both longer and more recent time 
periods. As a result, changes in social attitudes may also explain differences between the 
studies. Therefore, Bowman's conclusions regarding the relationship between marital 
status and retention should not be generalized to the wider population of officers. This 
thesis utilizes nearly the entire population of nuclear submarine officers commissioned 
between 1977 and 1991. Consequently, a more accurate analysis of the population will 
be possible. 
Like the officer corps, enlisted second-term retention (6 to 10 years of active 
service) also decreased in the 1990's. In response to a significant drop in enlisted 
second-term retention between fiscal years 1992 and 1994, the Center for Naval Analyses 
was tasked to develop a predictive model that would relate Navy policy and personal 
characteristics of enlisted personnel to second-term retention. Moore et al. (1996) 
utilized various non-pecuniary factors such as civilian unemployment rate, marital and 
dependency status, race and gender in regression models to estimate the impact of each 
on enlisted retention. The study found that marital status was indeed a significant 
predictor of enlisted retention decisions. Married sailors were 28 percent less likely to 
leave after their first enlistment than their single counterparts. Furthermore, regardless of 
marital status, the probability of leaving after a first-term enlistment decreased with the 
number of children (Moore et al., 1996). 
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Other studies have also examined enlisted reenlistment behavior by utilizing 
models similar to those noted above. John T. Warner and Matthew S. Goldberg (1983) 
attempted to analyze the effects of non-pecuniary factors on enlisted pay elasticities. 
Using data describing all enlisted personnel who made an initial reenlistment decision 
between fiscal year 1974 and 1978, the study divided personnel into sixteen occupational 
groups to test the hypothesis that pay elasticities are inversely related to the non- 
pecuniary variable of sea duty. Again, marital status was simply a demographic control 
variable, yet it yielded some very interesting results. Warner and Goldberg found that 
married individuals reenlisted at higher rates than single persons across all occupation 
groups. Since their pay variable took account of pay differences arising from marital 
status, the retention differences must be due to factors other than the direct pay 
differential. Unfortunately, the study made little attempt to explain the difference other 
than to speculate that married personnel may place a greater value on the non-pecuniary 
benefits of military service such as health care for dependents. 
At this point, it is clear that most retention research that includes marital and 
dependency status in its statistical modeling finds that it is a potential predictor of officer 
and enlisted retention. In a 1992 study regarding personnel tempo of operations and 
enlisted retention, Quester et al. offered two potential explanations. 
Individuals who are married at the time of reenlistment may be 
expected to have higher reenlistment rates for two possible reasons. First, 
the decision to marry may be made jointly with the reenlistment decision. 
Individuals who choose to get married during their first-term of service 
may be signaling a relatively high degree of satisfaction with a Navy 
lifestyle. (The vast majority of individuals are single when they begin 
active duty.) Second, marriage often changes an individual's preferences 
for the attributes and benefits of Navy employment. In particular, the 
reservation wage may fall if an individuals desire for job security 
intensifies with marriage. In either case, married sailors are more likely to 
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reenlist, other things being equal. The relationship has also been found in 
past studies of reenlistment behavior both for sailors and personnel in 
other services (Quester et al., 1992). 
Similarly, Moore et al. (1996) also suggested an explanation for this retention 
phenomenon. That study asserted that married personnel or those with additional 
dependents may be less likely to undertake disruptive career changes. It can be inferred 
then that they (married sailors) must also interpret a much higher cost of leaving than 
their single counterparts. 
Very pertinent to this study, Cadigan (2000) analyzed the family status of enlisted 
personnel in the U. S. Navy. His study compared the number of enlisted members with 
families in the Navy with similar groups in the civilian sector. The study found that 
military personnel are more likely to be both married and have children than a similar 
group of civilians even when controlling for a variety of demographic factors. Cadigan 
offers two possible interpretations of this difference. 
Alternatively, practices or policies enacted by the military may 
either make marriage more attractive to military personnel or lead those 
who are more likely to get married into military service. The structure of 
military compensation, with its focus on pay, allowances and the 
provisions of certain goods in kind, may make military service more 
attractive than jobs in the private sector for individuals with families. 
Also, policies for those already in the military may favor members with 
families. For example, military members with families are offered either 
family quarters or larger allowances than single members. Other benefits 
that differ according to dependent status (including transportation and 
travel allowances, separation pay, etc.) may encourage a greater 
percentage of enlisted personnel to marry (Cadigan, 2000). 
Therefore, from a cost of leaving perspective, those sailors with families simply find it 
much harder to pursue civilian job opportunities than their single counterparts, and those 
without families either feel compelled to marry or leave the service. 
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Next, Cadigan (2000) attempted to determine if military members with 
dependents performed differently than those without. Unfortunately, the results were 
inconclusive. The study notes that prior performance research agrees that married 
soldiers and sailors have lower attrition rates, as well as proportionally fewer indiscipline 
and substance abuse charges. On the other hand, other military performance research 
shows higher promotion rates for single enlisted men and women within the competitive 
grades (E-5 to E-9), as well as fewer problems responding to short notice alerts and unit 
deployments. Although much of the civilian performance research indicates that 
marriage makes civilian men more productive as measured by earnings (marriage 
premium), it is inconclusive as to whether marriage has the same effect on those in the 
military. 
On the other hand, the presence of the marriage premium in the civilian sector is 
very well documented. To distinguish the origins of the marriage premium, at least three 
separate hypotheses have been offered: (1) married men are more productive, (2) married 
men are evaluated more highly by their superiors, or (3) unobserved factors that cannot 
be separated from marital status positively influence civilian earnings. Krieg (2000) 
analyzed a large sample of first-term United States Marines to determine if a marriage 
premium existed in the military as it did in the civilian workforce. The study's results 
supported the second hypothesis noted above - married workers are evaluated more 
highly by their superiors. Although the study showed that married Marines were more 
highly evaluated by their superiors, it did not permit either of the remaining hypotheses to 
be rejected. Rather, higher evaluations can be consistent with a potential for higher 
productivity, as well as the possession of unobserved characteristics that are positively 
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correlated with both being married and productivity. As a result, the study offered 
several possible explanations for the presence of the marriage premium. 
First, Krieg argues that the marriage premium may follow Becker's (1993) 
hypothesis that married workers are able to specialize in their personal labor activities 
because their spouse specializes in housework. This allows married Marines to perform 
better on the job because they are not burdened by excessive household responsibilities. 
As a result, they are rewarded with higher evaluations. Second, marriage may heighten 
individual awareness of the importance of job performance. In this case, acquiring 
dependents may cause workers to mature faster, as well as place greater value on job 
performance. Finally, the marriage premium may be related to the marital status of the 
evaluating officer. Senior officers, like civilian supervisors, are older and more likely to 
be married. As a result, senior officers may use higher evaluations as a reward for the 
increased responsibilities of their married subordinates. Although Krieg was able to 
show a marriage premium existed in the United States Marine Corps, other performance 
research, like that noted by Cadigan above, yields mixed results. As a result, family 
status has yet to be conclusively proven significantly related to military performance. 
It is extremely difficult to definitively prove causality between demographic 
variables such as race, gender and marital status and outcomes such as performance or 
the decision to stay or leave. Mehay (1995), although analyzing the impact of 
racial/ethnic status on performance, conceded difficulty in drawing conclusions from his 
models as follows: 
The multivariate models are purely descriptive, in that they attempt 
to statistically identify and compare the relative effects of different types 
of determinants on officer career outcomes.     The search for causal 
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relationships is considerably more complicated and typically calls for 
speculative conclusions (Mehay, 1995). 
It is legitimate to infer the same difficulties exist when analyzing the impact of marital 
status on nuclear submarine officer retention. However, it will be possible to draw 
inferences about possible causality between marital status and retention. The results may, 
of course, be consistent with alternative interpretations, which, in turn, will call for 
speculative conclusions. Consequently, further research may be needed to separate the 
alternative interpretations. 
This thesis extends research on military officer retention, but more specifically 
analyzes marital and dependency status as predictors of retention rather than simply 
control variables. Historically, submarine officers have given family separation as a 
major reason for leaving the Navy. This study will determine if officer retention 
behavior in the submarine force follows the same trends as the studies described above 
when analyzed alone. 
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HL DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
This chapter describes the database and how it is used to estimate the statistical 
relationship between marital status and nuclear submarine officer retention beyond the 
minimum service requirement (MSR). The various logit model specifications are 
described, along with the dependent variable and the explanatory variables used in each 
model. 
A. DESCRD7TION OF THE DATABASE 
The database used in this study comes from one that includes all of the newly 
commissioned nuclear submarine officers who entered the Navy between 1977 and 1991. 
The database tracks these entry cohorts through the end of their minimum service 
requirement. Dr. William Bowman of the United States Naval Academy provided the 
portion of the database describing submarine officers commissioned between 1977 and 
1985. Dr. Bowman constructed the file by merging two administrative data files 
maintained on every naval officer by the Naval Bureau of Personnel, Washington, D. C. 
The two data files are the Navy History Promotion File and The Naval Officer Fitness   . 
Report Summary File. The Navy History Promotion File consists of various data 
elements taken from Officer Data Cards and the promotion outcomes from the promotion 
boards for each fiscal year. The Naval Officer Fitness Report Summary File records 
summary performance data for officers included in the data set. These two files were 
merged with the Officer Loss File, provided by the Defense Manpower Data Center 
(DMDC), which records both the timing of and the reason for separation. Dr. Bowman 
also provided the portion of the database describing nuclear submarine officers 
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commissioned between 1986 and 1991. When combined, the resulting database contains 
detailed information describing the demographic characteristics, pre-commissioning 
characteristics, performance history and promotion success for nearly all of the nuclear 
submarine officers commissioned between 1977 and 1991. 
B. VARIABLE DEFINITIONS 
This section explains the variables utilized in specifications of the retention 
models. It provides an overview of all explanatory and dependent variables, explains 
why each variable belongs in the model and discusses their hypothesized effects. 
Descriptive statistics are provided in Tables 1 and 2. 
1. Dependent Variables 
a. RETAIN. The dichotomous variable for retention, RETAIN, is set 
equal to 1 if a submarine officer remained on active service beyond his MSR (5 years of 
active service); otherwise RETAIN = 0. Officers who separate at, or prior to, or 
immediately following completion of their MSR are considered a loss, while those who 
remain a nominal one to two years past their MSR are considered retained.1 Table 1 
provides descriptive statistics on the dependent variable for retention and shows that 60 
percent of the 4294 submarine officers who entered the Navy between 1977 and 1985 
stayed at least one year past their MSR. 
1
 The typical career progression for a submarine officer allows for service in non-deployable (shore duty) 
billets during the two years immediately following the MSR. After this time, officers are required to return 
to operational submarine duty. Therefore, this study models retention as the decision to remain on active 
service past an individual's MSR even if he fails to return to sea duty after a tour ashore. 
20 
b. STAYER. The STAYER dichotomous variable models retention for 
submarine officers who were commissioned between 1977 and 1991. STAYER is set 
equal to 1 if a submarine officer remained on active service until the 0-4 promotion 
board; otherwise STAYER = 0. Officers who separate prior to the 0-4 promotion board 
are considered a loss, while those who remain until this time are considered retained. 
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics on the dependent variable STAYER for submarine 
officers commissioned between 1977 and 1985and shows that 38 percent of the 4294 
officers remained on active service until the 0-4 promotion board. Table 2 provides 
descriptive statistics on the dependent variable STAYER for submarine officers 
commissioned between 1986 and 1991 and shows that 29 percent of the 2614 officers 
remained on active service until the 0-4 promotion board. 
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Table 1. 1977-1985 Variable Descriptive Statistics 
VARIABLE CASES                      MEAN VALUE STD DEVIATION 
RETENTION VARIABLES 
RETAIN 4294                            .6067 .4885 
STAYER 4294 .3810 .4857 
MARITAL STATUS VARIABLES 
SINGLE 2255 .5252 .4994 
MARRIED-NO 
CHILDREN 




600 .1394 .3467 
COMMISSIONING SOURCE VARIABLES 
USNA 1496 .3484 .4765 
ROTC 1201 .2797 .4489 
OCS 1470 .3423 .4745 
ENLISTED/OTHER 127 .0296 .1694 
UNDERGRADUATE MAJOR VARIABLES 
BIOLOGY/ 
PHYSICAL SCI 
827 .1926 .3944 
MATH/ 
COMPUTER SCI 
371 .0864 .2810 
ENGINEER 2535 .5904 .4918 
SOCIAL 
SCIENCE 
126 .0293 .1688 
BUSINESS/ 
ECONOMICS 
112 .0261 .1596 
HUMANITIES 323 .0752 .2638 
AGE VARIABLE 
AGE 4284 22.36 1.71 
EARLY PERFORMANCE EVALUATIO] VS VARIABLES 
PRAP1 3590 .0895 .2833 
PRAP2 3577 .4706 .4592 
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Table 2.1986-1991 Variable Descriptive Statistics 
VARIABLE GASES MEAN VALUE STD DEVIATION 
RETENTION VARIABLE 
STAYER 2614 .2919 .4547 
MARITAL STATUS VARIABLES 
SINGLE 1297 .4962 .5001 
MARRIED-NO 
CHILDREN 




406 .1553 .3623 
COMMISSIONING SOURCE VARIABLES 
USNA 735 .2812 .4497 
NROTC 789 .3018 .4591 
OCS 915 .3500 .4771 
ENLISTED/              | 174 
OTHER 
.0665 .2493 




618 .2364 .4250 
ENGINEER 1715 .6561 .4751 
SOCIAL 
SCIENCE 
64 .0244 .1546 
BUSINESS/ 
ECONOMICS 
40 .0153 .1228 
HUMANITIES 34 .0130 .1133 
AGE VARIABLE 
AGECOMM 2614 22.46 1.58 
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2. Explanatory Variables 
The baseline variables used in the model to predict retention are 
marital and dependency status, commissioning source, undergraduate major, age at 
commissioning and results of early performance evaluations. These variables are 
described below. 
a. Marital and dependency status. Marital and dependency status as 
noted at the 0-3 promotion board is divided into two separate categories: single and 
married. It is included to investigate the relationship between marriage and submarine 
officer retention. Then, a second analysis is conducted to determine the independent 
effects of marital status and the presence of dependent children. Since nearly all of the 
research cited in the previous chapter has found a positive relationship between both 
marital and dependency status and retention, having either a spouse or a spouse with 
children can be expected to increase the likelihood of retention beyond MSR within the 
submarine community as well. 
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics on the marital and dependency status at 0-3 
of all officers commissioned between 1977 and 1985 included in the data set. 
Approximately 53 percent of submarine officers at the 0-3 promotion board are single, 
34 percent are married without children and 14 percent are married with children. Table 
2 provides descriptive statistics on the marital and dependency status at 0-3 of all officers 
commissioned between 1986 and 1991. Approximately 50 percent of submarine officers 
at the 0-3 promotion board are single, 34 percent are married without children and 16 
percent are married with children. 
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b. Commissioning Source. The commissioning source variable is 
divided into four separate categories: U. S. Naval Academy (USNA), Reserve Officers 
Training Corps (ROTC), Officer Candidate School (OCS) and Enlisted Commissioning 
Programs or Other. Commissioning source is included to control for retention 
differences between the various accession programs. The significant military training 
received at the Naval Academy has traditionally resulted in higher officer retention rates 
than the other commissioning programs. Therefore, potential retention differences 
between officers accessing from different sources must be accounted for before accurate 
analysis of the impact of marital status may occur. Table 1 shows the descriptive 
statistics associated with commissioning source for submarine officers commissioned 
between 1977 and 1985, and Table 2 shows the descriptive statistics for submarine 
officers commissioned between 1986 and 1991. During the years between 1977 and 
1985, about 34 percent of submarine officers were commissioned via USNA and OCS 
each, and 28 percent were commissioned via ROTC. During the years between 1986 and 
1991, 28 percent of submarine officers were commissioned via USNA 30 percent via 
ROTC and 35 percent via OCS. 
c. Undergraduate Major. For the portion of the data set describing 
submarine officers commissioned between 1977 and 1985, undergraduate major is 
introduced as a series of dichotomous variables divided into six categories: 
Biology/Physical Science, Math/Computer Science, Social Science, Business/Economics, 
Humanities and Engineering. For the remaining data (1886-1991), undergraduate major 
is introduced as a series of dichotomous variables divided into five categories: 
Biology/Physical Science/Math, Social Science, Business/Economics, Humanities and 
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Engineering.   This variable is included to control for potential retention differences 
resulting from educational background. Duffy (2000) found that surface warfare officers 
with an undergraduate major in engineering exhibited lower retention rates than officers 
with other college majors. Duffy speculated that this retention difference was the result 
of the higher civilian marketability of an officer with an engineering degree. It is 
legitimate to infer that the same phenomenon would be evident in the highly technical 
submarine service. As a result, the model investigates the retention effect of college 
major. Table 1 shows that 59 percent of submarine officers commissioned between 1977 
and 1985 have an engineering degree and 27 percent have a science or math degree. 
Table 2 shows that approximately 66 percent of submarine officers commissioned 
between 1986 and 1991 have an engineering degree and 24 percent have a science or 
math degree. 
d. Age. The age variable is based on an officer's age at 
commissioning. Ehrenberg and Smith (1993) noted that age is negatively correlated with 
mobility in the civilian labor market. As a result, it can be hypothesized that those who 
are older at commissioning may not only be more likely to have prior enlisted service, but 
also exhibit an increased likelihood of retention. Table 1 and 2 show the mean age at 
commissioning of officers commissioned between 1977 and 1985 is 22.36 with a 
standard deviation of 1.71, while the mean age for the rest is 22.46 with a standard 
deviation of 1.58.3 
e. Early Performance Evaluations (PRAP1/PRAP2Y ThePRAPl and 
PRAP2 variables are the ratios of officer fitness reports in grades 0-1 and 0-2 that were 
2
 143 cases were excluded between 1986 and 1991 due to missing information. 
310 cases were excluded due to missing information. 
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scored with a recommendation for accelerated promotion (RAP) to the total number of 
valid fitness reports in those grades. For several reasons, early performance evaluations 
are a potentially important predictor of retention behavior. Officers who receive a 
significant number of RAP's may not only be exhibiting exceptional job performance, 
but also a greater taste for naval service. An alternative explanation for any differential 
in performance between married and unmarried officers is that superiors might simply 
evaluate married subordinates higher than their single counterparts. (Krieg, 2000) Table 
1 shows the descriptive statistics associated with PRAP1 and PRAP2.4 While only 9 
percent of 0-1 fitness reports received a RAP, 47 percent of 0-2 reports were RAP'ed. 
f Commissioning Year Group. The logit retention models also 
include a series of dummy variables for commissioning year with FY 1980 as the omitted 
year group for the portion of the data set describing officers commissioned between 1977 
and 1985. (FY 1989 is the omitted year group for the portion describing 1986 through 
1991) This variable controls for differences in retention behavior between different entry 
cohorts. 
C. METHODOLOGY 
The purpose of this analysis is to determine the difference in retention behavior, if 
any, between submarine officers who are currently married at the 0-3 promotion board 
and those who are single. In the second model, marital status is interacted with 
dependent children to create three separate marital/dependent status categories. 
Retention was modeled using binary logit analysis because the dependent variables 
4
 704 cases were excluded from PRAP1 and 717 cases were excluded from PRAP2 due to missing 
information 
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describing retention are dichotomous. Four models were constructed to determine the 
effect of marital status (single versus married) and/or dependency status (married with 
children versus married with no children) on nuclear submarine officer retention, holding 
other retention predictors constant. Table 3 outlines the specifications of the four logit 
models. 
Model A includes the basic background characteristics (Commissioning Source, 
Undergraduate Major, Age and Early Performance) and a single dummy variable for 
married officers with single as the omitted category. Model B adds the interactions 
between marital status and dependents to test for the differential effect of the presence of 
dependent children. Models C and D use similar methodology to determine differences 
in retention behavior through the 0-4 promotion board. MSR retention and the effect of 
early performance evaluations as a predictor of retention cannot be determined for 
officers commissioned between 1986 and 1991 due to limitations of the data set. As a 
result, models C and D analyze retention through the 0-4 promotion board for both the 
1977-1985 and 1986-1991 cohorts.5 
There is a six -year differential between marital and dependency status as measured at the 0-3 promotion 
board and retention as measured at the 0-4 promotion board. As a result, comparisons of MSR retention 
and 0-4 promotion board retention for the 1977-1985 cohorts will allow retention behavior results for the 
later cohorts to be inferred. 
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Table 3. Nuclear Submarine Officer Retention Modeling Methodology  
A. Logit MSR Retention Model Based on Marital Status (Cohorts = 1977-1985): 
RETAIN = f(Married, Commissioning Source, Undergraduate Major, Commissioning 
Year Group, Age, Performance Evaluations) 
B. Logit MSR Retention Model Based on Marital Status With Dependents 
(Cohorts = 1977-1985): 
RETAIN = f(Married with dependents, Married no dependents, Commissioning 
Source, Undergraduate Major, Commissioning Year Group, Age, Performance 
Evaluations) 
C. Logit Retention (0-4 Promotion Board) Model Based on Marital Status 
(Cohorts = 1977-1991): 
STAYER = f(Married, Commissioning Source, Undergraduate Major, Commissioning 
Year Group, Age) 
D. Logit Retention (0-4 Promotion Board) Model Based on Marital Status with 
Dependents (Cohorts = 1977-1991): 
STAYER = f(Married with dependents, Married no dependents, Commissioning 
Source, Undergraduate Major, Commissioning Year Group, Age)  
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IV. DATA ANALYSIS 
This chapter reports the results of the multivariate logit models used to analyze 
the effect of marital and dependency status on nuclear submarine officer retention beyond 
the MSR, while controlling for other important retention factors such as commissioning 
source, undergraduate major and early performance evaluations. First, the probability of 
retention beyond the MSR for submarine officers commissioned between 1977 and 1985 
is predicted by including marital status with the explanatory variables in the baseline 
model. Next, after including an explanatory variable describing the dependency status of 
these same cohorts, a second probability of retention past the MSR is estimated. A 
second set of analyses predicts the probability of retention through the 0-4 promotion 
board for cohorts commissioned between 1977 and 1991 by using the same models. 
Logit estimates for each model are provided in tables throughout this chapter. 
Because the logit coefficients fail to indicate the effects of changes in each explanatory 
variable on retention, marginal effects are calculated so that the reader can easily see the 
effects of these changes on the overall probability of retention beyond the MSR. Results 
of each model are discussed in the corresponding section. 
A. MSR RETENTION MODEL INCLUDING MARITAL STATUS 
(1977-1985 COHORTS) 
Table 4 displays the maximum likelihood estimates of the MSR retention logit 
model (based on marital status alone) for cohorts commissioned between 1977 and 1985. 
In this model, five explanatory variables are significant at the .05 level or better, and two 
more variables are significant at the .10 level. Being married at the 0-3 promotion board, 
majoring in biology or the physical sciences during undergraduate studies, being older at 
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commissioning and obtaining a commission via an enlisted commissioning program are 
all positively associated with retention beyond the MSR. Based on the computed 
marginal effects, the explanatory variables noted above increase the probability of 
retention beyond the MSR by .02, .03, .02 and .15 respectively.6 Additionally, the more 
times an officer is recommended for accelerated promotion as a Lieutenant (j.g.) the 
higher his probability of retention beyond the MSR. The computed marginal effect for 
the PRAP2 variable indicates that recommendations for accelerated promotion as an 0-2 
increases MSR retention probability by . 10. 
Only two statistically significant explanatory variables are negatively associated 
with MSR retention; submarine officers commissioned via ROTC and OCS exhibit a 
lower retention probability when compared to the USNA reference group (.05 and .19 
lower, respectively). 
The majority of the submarine officers in the data sets were engineering majors. Relative to that group, 
officers who majored in science are significantly more likely to retain past the MSR; other majors do not 








FOR MARITAL STATUS: SINGLE = REFERENCE CATEGORY 
MARRIED .138 .076 .069 .0249 
FOR COMMISSIONING SOURCE: USNA = REFERENCE CATEGORY 
ROTC -.300 .098 .002 -.0541 
OCS -1.070 .098 .000 -.1929 
ENLISTED/ 
OTHER 
.835 .425 .050 .1505 








-.047 .136 .731 -.0085 
SOCIAL 
SCIENCE 
-.183 .226 .419 -.0329 
BUSINESS/ 
ECONOMICS 
-.080 .234 .733 -.0144 
HUMANITIES .015 .144 .915 .0027 
AGE .115 .029 .000 .0207 
PRAP1 .199 .146 .172 .0359 
PRAP2 .588 .089 .000 .1059 
CONSTANT -2.048 .633 .001 
CHI                                                 -2 LOG 




B. MSR RETENTION MODEL INCLUDING DEPENDENCY STATUS 
(1977-1985 COHORTS) 
Table 4 found that being married was marginally important in explaining nuclear 
submarine officer retention beyond the MSR. Table 5 displays the maximum likelihood 
estimates of the MSR retention logit model based on the independent effect of dependent 
children for cohorts commissioned between 1977 and 1985. Again, five explanatory 
variables are significant at the .05 level or better, and two more are significant at the . 10 
level. Being married with one or more children at the 0-3 promotion board is statistically 
significant at the .01 level and increases the MSR retention probability by .07. Being 
married with children is one of the strongest retention predictors in the model. On the 
other hand, being married but having no children is an insignificant predictor of the 
retention probability. The computed marginal effects show that increased age at 
commissioning increases retention probability by .02. Being commissioned via an 
enlisted commissioning program still exerts a significant positive effect on the retention 
probability with a . 13 increase for obtaining a commission in this manner. Additionally, 
majoring in biology or the physical sciences during undergraduate studies, as well as 
obtaining recommendations for accelerated promotion as a Lieutenant (j.g.) increase 
MSR retention probability by .03 and . 11, respectively. As with the previous model, 
officers commissioned via ROTC and OCS exhibit a lower retention probability. 
(Approximately . 05 and . 19 lower for each) 
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FOR MARITAL STATUS: SINGLE = REFERENCE CATEGORY 
MARRIED/ 
NO CHILD 




.403 .126 .001 .0726 
FOR COMMISSIONING SOURCE: USNA = REFERENCE CATEGORY 
ROTC -.305 .098 .002 -.0549 
OCS -1.076 .098 .000 -.1939 
ENLISTED/ 
OTHER 
.741 .427 .083 .1336 








-.052 .136 .700 -.0094 
SOCIAL 
SCIENCE 
-.187 .226 .410 -.0337 
BUSINESS/ 
ECONOMICS 
-.108 .235 .645 -.0195 
HUMANITIES .007 .144 .962 .0013 
AGE .098 .029 .001 .0177 
PRAP1 .193 .146 .187 .0348 
PRAP2 .598 .089 .000 .1078 
CONSTANT -1.662 .650 .011 
CRT                                                   -2 LOG                                                    SAMPLE 
SQUARE:          299 087                  LDXELfflOOD:    4197.026                   SIZE: 3570 
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C. MODEL OF RETENTION TO THE 0-4 PROMOTION BOARD INCLUDING 
MARITAL STATUS (1977-1991 COHORTS) 
Table 6 displays the maximum likelihood estimates of the logit retention (0-4 
promotion board) model based on marital status alone for cohorts commissioned between 
1977 and 1985. In this model, eight explanatory variables are statistically significant 
predictors of retention to the 0-4 promotion board (five are significant at the .05 level or 
better, and three are significant at the . 10 level). Being married at the 0-3 promotion 
board increases the probability of retention to the 0-4 promotion board by .03, and the 
variable is significant at the .05 level. Unlike the previous MSR retention models, 
majoring in biology or physical science does not predict a higher retention probability. 
Rather, officers with undergraduate degrees in the humanities exhibit a .04 higher 
retention probability, while those who majored in math/computer science, and 
business/economics show lower retention probability; -.04 and -.07, respectively. As 
with the previous models, increased age at commissioning and obtaining a commission 
via an enlisted commissioning program positively affect the retention probability to the 
0-4 promotion board, while being commissioned via ROTC and OCS negatively affect 
retention. 
Table 7 displays the results for cohorts commissioned between 1986 and 1991. 
For these later cohorts, being married at the 0-3 promotion board results in a .06 higher 
probability of retention to the 0-4 promotion board and is significant at the .01 level. 
The only explanatory variable that differs from the 1977 through 1985 cohorts in its 
effect on retention is being a humanities major during undergraduate studies. For the 
1986 through 1991 cohorts, being a humanities major is no longer a significant predictor 
of retention probability to the 0-4 promotion board. 
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FOR MARITAL STATUS: SINGLE = REFERENCE CATEGORY 
MARRIED .151 .067 .024 .0272 
FOR COMMISSIONING SOURCE: USNA = REFERENCE CATEGORY 
ROTC -.349 .082 .000 -.0629 
OCS -.994 .090 .000 -.1792 
ENLISTED/ 
OTHER 
.701 .278 .012 .1264 








-.224 .123 .068 -.0404 
SOCIAL 
SCIENCE 
.053 .192 .783 .0095 
BUSINESS/ 
ECONOMICS 
-.392 .212 .064 -.0707 
HUMANITIES .228 .128 .076 .0411 
AGE .194 .025 .000 .0349 
CONSTANT -4.653 .551 .000 
CHI                                                   -2 LOG                                                    SAMPLE 
SQUARE:          350.073                  LDXELDTOOD:    5344.577                   SIZE: 4284 
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Table 7. Logit 
Marital Status 







FOR MARITAL STATUS: SINGLE = REFERENCE CATEGORY 
MARRIED .343 .093 .000 .0618 
FOR COMMISSIONING SOURCE: USNA = REFERENCE CATEGORY 
ROTC -.329 .117 .005 -.0593 
OCS -.522 .119 .000 -.0941 
ENLISTED/ 
OTHER 
.928 .223 .000 .1673 




.210 .105 .046 .0379 
SOCIAL 
SCIENCE 
.273 .283 .336 .0492 
BUSINESS/ 
ECONOMICS 
-1.012 .477 .034 -.1824 
HUMANITIES .067 .389 .863 .0121 
AGE .181 .035 .000 .0326 
CONSTANT -4.968 .774 .000 
CHI                                                  -2 LOG                                                  SAMPLE 
SQUARE:          214487                  LDXELmOOD:    2942 363                   SIZE: 2614 
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D. MODEL OF RETENTION TO THE 0-4 PROMOTION BOARD INCLUDING 
DEPENDENCY STATUS (1977-1991 COHORTS) 
Table 8 displays the maximum likelihood estimates of the logit retention (0-4 
promotion board) model, using the marriage and dependent interaction variables, for 
cohorts commissioned between 1977 and 1985. In this model, like the previous models 
describing these same cohorts, marriage alone is not a significant predictor of retention 
behavior to the 0-4 promotion board. However, being married with one or more children 
is associated with a .07 higher probability of retention, which is significant at the .01 
level. Additionally, age at commissioning, accession from enlisted commissioning 
programs and majoring in humanities remain positive influences on retention probability, 
while majoring in math/computer science or business/economics, as well as being 
commissioned via ROTC and OCS remain negative influences on the probability of 
retention to the 0-4 promotion board. 
Table 9 displays the model results for the cohorts commissioned between 1986 
and 1991. The results indicate a shift in the effect of marital status (without the presence 
of dependent children) on retention to the 0-4 promotion board. For these cohorts, being 
married without children now becomes a positive predictor of retention (significant at the 
.05 level). Being married with no children at the 0-3 promotion board increases the 
probability of retention to the 0-4 promotion board by .04, while being married with one 
or more children at the same point increases the probability of retention by .12 and is 
significant at the .01 level. As seen in the previous retention models, being older at 
commissioning and obtaining a commission via an enlisted commissioning program 
positively influence retention behavior, while being commissioned via ROTC and OCS 
negatively influence retention to the 0-4 promotion board. Being older at commissioning 
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and accession from an enlisted commissioning program increase the probability of 
retention by .03 and . 15, respectively. Accession from ROTC lowers the probability of 
retention to the 0-4 promotion board by .06, and obtaining a commission via OCS 
reduces the probability by .15. 
The results of all multivariate logit models show that simply being married at the 
0-3 promotion board is weakly correlated with nuclear submarine officer retention 
beyond the MSR. When marriage alone is interacted with the presence of dependent 
children, being married without children remains a statistically significant predictor of 
retention for the 1986 through 1991 cohorts only. On the other hand, being married with 
one or more children at the 0-3 promotion board is strongly correlated with retention 
beyond the MSR, and is statistically significant at the .05 level or better in all models. 
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Table 8. Logit] 
Dependents 







FOR MARITAL STATUS: SINGLE = REFERENCE CATEGORY 
MARRIED/ 
NO CHILD 




.385 .107 .000 .0694 
FOR COMMISSIONING SOURCE: USNA = REFERENCE CATEGORY 
ROTC -.351 .082 .000 -.0633 
OCS -.999 .090 .000 -.1801 
ENLISTED/ 
OTHER 
.620 .280 .027 .1118 








-.228 .123 .063 -.0411 
SOCIAL 
SCIENCE 
.055 .192 .773 .0099 
BUSINESS/ 
ECONOMICS 
-.413 .212 .052 -.0744 
HUMANITIES .219 .129 .089 .0395 
AGE .179 .026 .000 .0322 
CONSTANT -4.316 .564 .000 
cm                                            -2 LOG 












FOR MARITAL STATUS: SINGLE = REFERENCE CATEGORY 
MARRIED/ 
NO CHILD 




.692 .135 .000 .1247 
FOR COMMISSIONING SOURCE: USNA = REFERENCE CATEGORY 
ROTC ^> -* *> -.3JJ .117 .004 -.0600 
OCS -.549 .120 .000 -.0989 
ENLISTED/ 
OTHER 
.825 .226 .000 .1487 




.207 .105 .049 .0373 
SOCIAL 
SCIENCE 
.284 .283 .316 .0511 
BUSINESS/ 
ECONOMICS 
-1.028 .481 .033 -.1853 
HUMANITIES .119 .389 .760 .0214 
AGE .160 .036 .000 .0288 
CONSTANT -4 483 .788 .000 
CHI                                                 -2 LOG                                                 SAMPLE 
SQUARE:          226 704                  LDXELDTOOD:    2930.146                   SIZE: 2614 
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
This study focused on determining the impact of marital status on nuclear 
submarine officer retention beyond the minimum service requirement (MSR). The 
ultimate goals of this study were to identify some of the significant factors affecting 
submarine officer retention, as well as to provide policy-makers with useful information 
regarding policies that may increase junior officer retention rates in the submarine force. 
The significant retention factors identified in this study (including marital and 
dependency status) are explained below. This chapter concludes with recommendations 
for policy changes and for further research. 
A. CONCLUSIONS 
The conclusions of this study are organized into two parts and are discussed 
below. The first part discusses the conclusions reached regarding the impact of marital 
status and the independent effect of dependent children on nuclear submarine officer 
retention beyond the MSR. The second part discusses conclusions reached regarding the 
effects of various control variables that were found to be significantly related to officer 
retention during the analysis. 
1. A nuclear submarine officer who is married with dependent children by the 
0-3 promotion board is more likely to continue on active duty beyond the MSR than 
single officers or those who are married with no children. Previous retention studies have 
utilized marital and dependency status as simple control variables rather than analyzing 
their specific effect on retention behavior. The results of this analysis indicate that there 
are very specific differences in the retention behavior between these groups. 
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The most interesting finding of this study is that marital status by itself is not 
significantly related to submarine officer retention beyond the MSR. Rather, as discussed 
in the previous chapter, when the variable describing dependent children is included in 
the statistical models, marital status itself becomes an insignificant predictor of officer 
retention.7 There are multiple explanations for these differences. 
First, the cost associated with leaving the military significantly increases when a 
submarine officer has children. The military pay structure increases the rate of 
compensation only when an officer gains his first dependent (i.e., marriage). However, 
the value of non-pecuniary compensation such as commissary and exchange privileges, 
medical coverage and housing allowances continue to increase as an officer gains 
additional dependents. For example, goods purchased at the commissary and exchange 
are tax-free, and are significantly less expensive than those offered in the civilian market. 
As a result, a submarine officer can provide his family with a higher standard of living 
while in the military than if he was a civilian who made a comparable yearly salary but 
was forced to obtain goods in the civilian market. Although housing allowances increase 
only when an officer gains his first dependent, the size of government quarters provided 
to the service member increases with additional dependents. Therefore, an officer can 
again provide a higher standard of living for his family in the military. Finally, the value 
of military medical coverage also continues to increase as an officer gains additional 
dependents. Medical evaluations and treatments can be scheduled as often as deemed 
necessary by the service member. Further, specialized treatments, as well as prescription 
7
 There is a weak positive relationship between marital status and retention to the 0-4 promotion board for 
the 1986-1991 cohorts. 
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drugs are provided to the family at no cost to the service member. Again, this allows the 
officer to use money, which would normally be used to defray these costs in the civilian 
market, to provide a higher standard of living for his family. Consequently, when 
combined, the value of these non-pecuniary benefits translate to a significantly higher 
cost of leaving for a submarine officer who is married with dependent children. 
It can be argued that submarine officers who are married without dependent 
children also experience the same increased cost of leaving described above. They, like 
their counterparts with dependent children, receive the same increase in monetary 
compensation, as well as the commissary, exchange and medical benefits available for 
the spouse. However, various lifestyle aspects associated with a naval career may 
counterbalance the increased value of both pecuniary and non-pecuniary benefits. Most 
retention research discusses the negative influence of family separation, erratic work 
hours and frequent relocation on individual retention behavior. Certainly, these aspects 
of the military lifestyle are difficult on a spouse regardless of the presence of dependent 
children. Family separation and erratic work hours strain the relationship between the 
service member and his spouse, while frequent relocations make it exceedingly difficult 
for a spouse to become established in a community, as well as limiting her civilian 
employment opportunities. The results of this study indicate that the positive increase in 
the military benefits associated with being married and the negative aspects of the 
military lifestyle may balance indicating no significant retention difference between 
single submarine officers and those who are married without dependent children. 
However, when there are children in a military family, the military compensation 
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structure does significantly increase the cost of leaving resulting in an increased 
probability that a nuclear submarine officer will retain beyond the MSR. 
Another explanation for differences in retention behavior between these groups 
may be the stability associated with military employment. Officers who are married with 
dependent children may be less likely to make a significant career change. Officers who 
separate from the naval service can usually expect a decrease in basic salary during the 
first few years of civilian employment. This pay decrease coupled with the loss of 
benefits such as tax-free goods and family healthcare attaches an even greater cost of 
leaving the Navy as an officer acquires dependent children. As discussed previously, 
family separation has traditionally been a significant negative influence on retention 
behavior. However, a submarine officer, as well as his family, may be more likely to 
accept this separation in exchange for the financial stability and comfort offered by the 
Navy. 
2. Several conclusions can be made regarding effect of various control variables 
utilized in this study. First, the older a submarine officer is at commissioning, the more 
likely he is to remain on active duty beyond his MSR. Two explanations may be given 
for this difference. First, officers who are older at commissioning may have served as 
enlisted sailors in the Navy prior to obtaining a commission. Therefore, their decision to 
pursue a commission may indicate a greater taste for military service. Second, officers 
who are older at commissioning may have held a job in the civilian sector prior to joining 
the Navy. As a result, these officers may be more likely to place a greater value on the 
pecuniary and non-pecuniary benefits offered by the military than officers who have only 
worked within the military. 
46 
Second, submarine officers commissioned via enlisted commissioning programs 
are more likely to remain on active duty beyond the MSR. Like the effect of age at 
commissioning, officers with prior enlisted service have indicated a greater taste for the 
military lifestyle. Further, these officers have likely compiled more years of service upon 
commissioning. Thus, the present value of retirement benefits is greater, as they have 
fewer years of service as an officer required before becoming eligible for military 
retirement. 
Third, the more times that an officer is recommended for accelerated promotion 
as a Lieutenant (j.g.) the more likely he is to remain on active duty beyond his MSR. 
Nearly 50 percent of the submarine officers commissioned between 1977 and 1985 were 
recommended for early promotion at least once. Although performance data were not 
available for officers commissioned between 1986 and 1991, it can be inferred that they 
would be evaluated similarly. These evaluations do little to affect long-term promotion 
potential. However, positive feedback (i.e., higher quality fitness reports) early in a 
submarine officer's career does have a distinct bearing on retention behavior beyond the 
MSR. Unfortunately, the Navy determined in 1999 that Ensign and Lieutenant (j.g.)'s 
would no longer receive recommendations for accelerated promotion when evaluated by 
their superiors. Rather, all O-l's and O-2's are given a promotable grade regardless of 
their performance in relation to their peers. This new policy is designed to encourage 
greater overall performance by all officers rather than to discourage the performance and 
retention of the 50 percent of submarine officers who never receive a recommendation 
for early promotion. Regardless, an important predictor of retention beyond the MSR has 
been lost. 
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Finally, being commissioned via the Reserve Officer's Training Corps (ROTC) 
and the Officer's Candidate School (OCS) are indicators that a submarine officer is less 
likely to remain on active duty beyond his MSR compared to being commissioned via the 
Naval Academy. As noted in previous studies, this result may be explained by the 
exposure to the Navy an officer receives prior to commissioning. A Naval Academy 
graduate has received four years of intense military indoctrination while obtaining his 
undergraduate degree. On the other hand, ROTC graduates receive a limited 
indoctrination during their four years of schooling, and OCS graduates have no 
indoctrination prior to attending a 13-week course at OCS immediately prior to their 
commission. As a result, ROTC and OCS graduates have had significantly less time than 
Naval Academy graduates to develop a taste for the Navy lifestyle and this difference 
appears to negatively influence retention behavior beyond the MSR. Although self- 
selection into USNA of individuals with a greater taste for military service explains a 
significant portion of the retention difference between these groups, pre-commissioning 
military exposure must also influence retention behavior. 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
The results of this study indicate that dependency status, as well as 
various performance and demographic factors do affect nuclear submarine officer 
retention beyond the MSR. Accordingly, several issues are raised that warrant further 
investigation. 
• Will retention differences persist between these groups when MSR retention is more 
accurately defined for submarine officers commissioned after 1985? 
• Why does there appear to be a shift after 1985 in the retention behavior of submarine 
officers who are married with no dependent children? 
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• Is it more cost effective for the Navy to increase the cost of leaving even more for 
submarine officers who are married, both with and without dependent children, rather 
than conduct policy changes targeted at improving single officer retention? 
• How has the Navy's current policy of not allowing junior officers to be recommended 
for accelerated promotion during their performance evaluations affected retention 
beyond the MSR? 
• Is there a way to increase the retention of ROTC and OCS graduates within the 
nuclear submarine community? 
Many possibilities exist for future research on the subject of officer retention 
in the nuclear submarine community. For example, this study relied on retention to the 
0-4 promotion board as a proxy for MSR retention when analyzing officers 
commissioned between 1986 and 1991. Consequently, applying a strict MSR retention 
model, like that used for officers commissioned between 1977 and 1985 in this study, 
would more accurately assess the implications of marital and dependency status on 
submarine officer retention behavior for the cohorts commissioned after 1985. Further, 
use of junior officer exit surveys and personal interview data obtained from officers who 
leave the submarine service may help to explain the apparent shift in retention behavior 
of submarine officers who are married but have no dependent children. Since this study 
only utilized data compiled for officers commissioned between 1977 and 1991, 
application of this model to year groups commissioned after the force reductions of the 
early 1990's would also positively contribute to the understanding of this issue in both 
the force reduction and post force reduction environment. 
Undoubtedly, future research should also investigate the impact of the Navy's 
policy to not assign a recommendation for accelerated promotion on Ensign and 
Lieutenant (j.g.) performance evaluations on MSR retention of the year groups involved. 
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Due to this policy change, one of the most significant predictors of submarine officer 
retention beyond the MSR is no longer being used to provide positive feedback to 
officers early in their career. Consequently, the effect of this change on retention 
behavior should be analyzed. 
As the Navy has tailored its system of pay and benefits to offset the stress of 
family separation, married submarine officers with dependent children experience an 
ever-increasing cost of leaving the naval service. With these pro-marriage policies in 
place, how then do we increase the cost of leaving of the single nuclear submarine 
officer? Clearly, we cannot change a single officer's perceptions of the non-pecuniary 
benefits offered by the military. However, as noted by Nakada (1996), "pay does matter" 
with regard to officer retention regardless of marital or dependency status. Therefore, 
increases in the Nuclear Officer Incentive Program bonus levels may not only increase 
the yearly salary of a single submarine officer, but also raise his personal cost of leaving. 
Further, other policy changes that can be made include raising the housing allowance for 
single officers, as well as offering government quarters rather than forcing single officers 
to buy or rent non-military housing. Finally, single officers could be offered a 
deployment allowance on par with the family separation allowance received by married 
officers. These monetary policy changes may not only raise a single officer's cost of 
leaving the naval service, but also promote perceptions of equity between the groups. 
Within the constraints of the current Department of Defense budget, the Navy 
may only change the most cost-effective policies in its effort to improve submarine 
officer retention. As a result, changing policies that increase the cost of leaving for single 
officers may be too expensive for the increased retention they achieve. Perhaps the most 
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cost-effective approach is to further increase the cost of leaving for married officers both 
with and without children (i.e. targeted pay raises, improved government housing, etc.). 
Changing policies that improve the retention of these two groups may both offset the 
losses of single submarine officers, as well as improve retention rates for a significantly 
lower cost. Unfortunately, this study only identified some significant factors affecting 
nuclear submarine officer retention. Future research will have to be conducted to 
determine the retention elasticities of specific policy changes for each group. Only then 
can concrete policy recommendation be made about how to improve nuclear submarine 
officer retention. 
Retention of highly skilled nuclear submarine officers is critical to the readiness 
of the nuclear submarine force. No single policy change will completely solve the 
current retention difficulties. However, an understanding of the issues raised in this and 
similar studies, as well as a willingness to address each will ensure that we continue to 
man our submarines with the highest caliber officers available. 
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